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IV

ARGUMENT
LIEBERMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BENEFITS
1.

Liberal Construction Rules Do Not Apply When Utah Law Does not
Support Such an Award.

Appellees argue that because Utah law promotes liberal construction of the Workers'
Compensation Act (the "Act"), additional benefits are justified in this case. Appellants agree
that Utah's courts and the Labor Commission should construe the Act in favor of coverage
and compensation. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). However,
this command does not dispense with the requirement that an injured party prove his case by
a preponderance of the evidence. See Lipman v. Ind. Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979).
Indeed, this court held in Jackson v. Industrial Comm'n, Memorandum Decision, 920804CA (Utah Ct. App. 1993), that "regardless of the remedial nature of the worker's
compensation statutes, a liberal construction cannot relieve the applicant from the threshold
requirement to demonstrate causation." Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (allowing
workers' compensation benefits only if requirements of this provision are met).
As previously stated in appellants' initial brief and below, appellants are not liable to
pay additional workers' compensation benefits due to the applicant's failure to meet the legal
causation test articulated in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and its
progeny, Large v. Industrial Comm'n. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Stokes v.
Board of Rev, of Ind. Comm'n. 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
1

2.

The Direct and Natural Consequences Rule is Synonymous with the
Proximate Causation Test.

Relying on the "direct and natural consequences rule" articulated in Larson's treatise
and Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n. 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
appellees maintain that additional benefits are awardable in this case. It is important to note
that in application, the "direct and natural consequences rule" articulated in Intermountain
and Larsons is synonymous with the proximate causation test applied in older Utah cases.
Compare A. Larson's Workers Compensation Law (Desk Edition) § 13.10 et. seq. with §
6.60. See Appellants' initial brief at 4. As stated in Large, proximate causation involves an
analysis of "foreseeability, negligence and intervening causes." Large, 758 P.2d at 956. In
Aetna Life Ins. v. Industrial Comm'n, 231 P. 442 (Utah 1924) the Utah Supreme Court
defined proximate cause as "that cause which naturally lead to, and which might have
expected to produce the result." Id at 444. The direct and natural consequences rule,
articulated by appellee and undoubtedly applied by the Commission, similarly involves the
analysis of foreseeability, natural results, intervening causes, and the fault of the claimant or
doctor, etc. See, e.g., Intermountain, 839 P.2d at 845; Mountain States Casing Serv.
McKean, 706 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1985); Larsons (Desk Edition) § 13.11 to 13.21.
However, in light of Allen, the Labor Commission's evaluation of this case based upon these
factors, especially fault, amounts to legal error.
3.

The Proximate Causation Test is Not the Appropriate Legal Test, Rather
the Allen Legal Causation test Applies.
2

The Utah Court of Appeals has clearly ruled in two post-Allen cases that a fault and
proximate causation analysis is "not appropriate for workers' compensation cases." Large,
758 P.2d at 956; see Stokes. 832 P.2d at 62; Appellants' initial brief at 12-16. In fact, this
Court held in Stokes that a proper analysis in workers compensation cases is the Allen legal
causation standard rather than a proximate causation and fault-based analysis. Despite this
precedent, however, Appellees maintain that Intermountain is inconsistent with Large and
Stokes and instead applies here. While we agree that the legal principles articulated in Large
and Stokes are somewhat inconsistent with the court's ruling in Intermountain, we believe
that the inconsistency is easily explained by a careful review of these cases. Specifically, in
Intermountain, the court stated:
We do not agree with IHC that the correct standard for determining employer
liability for subsequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury essentially
amounts to a "but for1' analysis. In Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean,
706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] subsequent
injury is compensable if it is found to be a natural result of a compensable
primary injury." Id. at 602 (emphasis added). A claimant "is not required to
show that his original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent injury, but
only that the initial work-related accident was a contributing cause ,f of the
subsequent injury. Id. (emphasis added). McKean and Perchelli both draw
from Larson's statement of the general rule regarding workers' compensation,
which provides in pertinent part:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an
aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is
compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a
compensable primary injury....
The applicable test includes an analysis of the facts surrounding the subsequent
injury and analysis of the connection between the subsequent injury and the
original compensable industrial injury.
3

Intermountain, 839 P.2d at 845-46.
Appellants respectfully submit that this Court erroneously relied upon pre-Allen case
law in rendering its decision in Intermountain.

Stokes, decided the same year as

Intermountain accurately states that the Allen legal causation standard applies in workers
compensation matters rather than a fault and proximate causation analysis. See Stokes, 832
P.2d at 62. Given the fact that the Intermountain decision relies upon cases pre-dating Allen,
that case is of little precedential authority and should not be considered by this Court.
In any event, even if this Court determines that the law is somewhat unclear, the better
view is that proximate causation (a.k.a., the direct and natural consequences rule) should not
apply in workers' compensation cases. First and most importantly, the Allen decision
already provides a "legal causation" analysis which takes into consideration injuries where
a person has a preexisting condition and then suffers a subsequent, contributing injury, such
as in this case. Under Allen, the analysis for this case is simple and straight-forward.1
Contrary to appellees' assertion, there is no qualification, nor should there be, that Allen's
legal causation test applies only to primary, as opposed to exacerbations of work-related,

1

In this case, the application of Allen would be as follows: (1) A determination
must be made whether a claimant has a preexisting condition. (2) The preexisting
condition must be contribute to the injury (i.e., the fact that the claimant has any
preexisting condition does not trigger the higher legal causation standard, the preexisting
condition must contribute ~ be relevant - to the injury). (3) If these requirements are
met, the application of the higher legal causation standard applies. (4) The industrial
nature of the subsequent injury should have no part in the analysis, unless of course the
second injury occurred in the same workplace whereupon the lower legal causation
standard of Allen (rather than the higher standard in Allen) would of course apply.
4

injuries. Moreover, the fact that there is no case law applying post-Allen law to a case such
as Lieberman's is simply irrelevant. Allen should apply in all contexts when a court must
determine the liability for two contributory injuries when at least one of them is industrial.
The second policy reason supporting appellants' position is that Utah's appellate
courts have consistently held that the workers' compensation system is not fault-based. See
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird, 2000 UT 94, ^[19, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (stating "[t]he
workers1 compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo between employers and employees.
.. Under the Act's balancing of rights, 'employees are able to recover for job-related injuries
without showing fault.'"); Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456 (Utah 1996)
(stating [t]he Workers' Compensation Act is predicated entirely on the status of an
employment relationship rather than on fault). In Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel, 965
P.2d 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court stated:
The [Workers' Compensation] Act is a humanitarian and economical system
designed to provide relief to the victims of industrial accidents:
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their
employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Large, this Court stated:
We agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as that term is commonly used, is
not appropriate in workers' compensation cases. Proximate cause is used
primarily in tort law and involves analysis offoreseeability, negligence and
intervening causes. These factors are not present in the statutory workers9
compensation system, which excludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1
Workmen's Compensation Law §6.60 (1985). Although proximate cause is
not an appropriate standard, the Utah Supreme Court has, nevertheless,
required proof of a causal relationship as a prerequisite to awarding workers'
5

compensation benefits. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986).
Large. 758 P.2d at 956.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission's consideration of fault — that is, whether
Lieberman was "negligent" in jumping into the truck — was legally improper under Utah
Supreme Court law. See Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ]fl9. Accordingly, appellants
respectfully urge this Court to reverse the Commission's ruling and apply the legal causation
standard articulated in Allen.
4.

Even if the Proximate Causation Test Applies, the Commission
Committed Legal Error in Concluding that Lieberman's Act of Jumping
into his Truck was the Natural and Direct Result of His Initial Work
Injury

Assuming arguendo that the proximate causation analysis applies, whether
Lieberman's own act ofjumping into his truck breaks the necessary chain of causation under
this test is a matter of law. Accordingly, the Commission's ruling that Lieberman was not
"negligent" need not be reviewed by this Court under any discretionary standard, but rather
must be reviewed for correctness.
Basic proximate causation principles, having their origin in tort law, require that there
be a causal connection between the original and subsequent injury. See Mountain States, 706
P.2d at 602-03. If there is no causal connection between the initial and subsequent injury,
the latter will constitute an independent (a.k.a, superceding) intervening cause, breaking the
chain of causation.

See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 180(b). As stated in

6

appellants' initial brief, Lieberman's act ofjumping into his vehicle was not a "natural result
o f the first injury. It was not a medical complication that flowed from the original accident,
see Perchelli v. Utah Ind. Comm'n. 475 P.2d 835, 837-38 (Utah 1970), but rather was an
entirely new accident which breaks the chain of causation. Moreover, contrary to appellee's
assertion, Lieberman's act ofjumping into his vehicle can be considered superceding simply
because it is attributable to the claimant's own negligence (i.e., carelessness and inattention).
See Mountain States, 706 P.2d at 603. Accordingly, even if the proximate causation
standard applies, the Commission legally erred in concluding that the May 22, 1999 event
did not relieve McKesson of liability.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the Labor Commission's decision
to award Lieberman additional workers compensation benefits. The Commission selected
the incorrect legal standard to this matter. The proper legal test is the Allen legal causation
test. In any event, even if the Commission selected the appropriate legal standard, it wrongly
applied it in this case.
If this Court chooses to apply the standard set forth by Appellees and in
Intermountain, the legal causation rule will hinge on when the industrial accident occurred
(ie., whether the industrial accident preceded or followed an industrial or non-industrial
accident). This was certainly not the intent of the Workers Compensation Act or the
Supreme Court in delineating the Allen legal causation test. Because the appropriate

7

standard is Allen's legal causation test, this Court must remand this matter to the Labor
Commission for proper evaluation.
Respectfully submitted this hr~

day of ->\pA \

2001.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Henry K. Cnai II
Kristy L. Bertelsen
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